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T R A N S F U S I O N  C O M P L I C A T I O N S
 
Transfusion-associated transmission of West Nile virus, 
United States 2003 through 2005
 
Susan P. Montgomery, Jennifer A. Brown, Matthew Kuehnert, Theresa L. Smith, Nicholas Crall, 
Robert S. Lanciotti, Alexandre Macedo de Oliveira, Thomas Boo, Anthony A. Marfin, and the 2003 West 
Nile Virus Transfusion-Associated Transmission Investigation Team
 
BACKGROUND: 
 
National blood donation screening for 
West Nile virus (WNV) started in June 2003, after the 
documentation of WNV transfusion-associated 
transmission (TAT) in 2002.
 
STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS: 
 
Blood donations 
were screened with investigational nucleic acid 
amplification assays in minipool formats. Blood collection 
agencies (BCAs) reported screening results to state and 
local public health authorities. Donor test results and 
demographic information were forwarded to CDC via 
ArboNET, the national electronic arbovirus surveillance 
system. State health departments and BCAs also 
reported suspect WNV TATs to CDC, which investigated 
these reports to confirm WNV infection in blood 
transfusion recipients in the absence of likely mosquito 
exposure.
 
RESULTS: 
 
During 2003 to 2005, a total of 1,425 
presumptive viremic donors were reported to CDC from 
41 states. Of 36 investigations of suspected WNV TAT in 
2003, 6 cases were documented. Estimated viremia 
levels were available for donations implicated in four TAT 
cases; the median estimated viremia was 0.1 plaque-
forming units (PFUs) per mL (range, 0.06-0.50 PFU/mL; 
1 PFU equals approximately 400 copies/mL).
 
CONCLUSIONS: 
 
National blood screening for WNV 
identified and removed more than 1,400 potentially 
infectious blood donations in 2003 through 2005. Despite 
the success of screening in 2003, some residual WNV 
TAT risk remained due to donations containing very low 
levels of virus. Screening algorithms employing selected 
individual-donation testing were designed to address this 
residual risk and were fully implemented in 2004 and 
2005. Continued vigilance for TAT will evaluate the 
effectiveness of these strategies.
 
est Nile virus (WNV) is a flavivirus main-
tained in an enzootic cycle of mosquito
transmission among birds; humans are
incidental hosts. The strain of WNV cur-
rently circulating in North America can cause a spectrum
of illness in infected humans. Based on estimates derived
from serosurveys,
 
1,2
 
 approximately 20 percent of infec-
tions cause an acute febrile illness; less than 1 percent
result in serious neuroinvasive disease, including enceph-
alitis, meningitis, and acute flaccid paralysis. Nearly
80 percent of infected people remain asymptomatic and
many develop viremia without discernible illness, raising
blood safety concerns.
 
3,4
 
 Based on an estimated 140 infec-
tions for every case of neuroinvasive disease,
 
1,2
 
 as many as
800,000 human WNV infections occurred in the United
W
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States during 2002 and 2003 when 5812 cases of neuroin-
vasive disease were reported.
 
5,6
 
In 2002, WNV became the first vector-borne flavivirus
found to be transmitted through blood transfusion; 23
cases of WNV transfusion-associated transmission (TAT)
were documented in persons transfused with blood com-
ponents from 16 viremic donors.
 
7,8
 
 In response to this new
risk to blood safety, US and Canadian blood collection
agencies (BCAs) deferred donors with fever and headache,
symptoms suggestive of WNV-related illness, during the
week before donation and blood screening assays were
implemented during the 2003 WNV epidemic season.
As part of public health surveillance for WNV, CDC,
state, and local public health officials began collecting
reports of suspected TAT in 2002. In addition, BCAs initi-
ated retrospective testing of archived individual-donation
samples in selected areas and traced reactive donations
forward to identify possible TATs. Starting in June 2003,
nucleic acid amplification tests (NATs) were used to iden-
tify and remove potentially infectious components col-
lected from asymptomatic donors. In this report, we
present the results of blood donor surveillance and
describe the results of investigations of reported WNV TAT
cases since 2002.
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS
 
Blood donor screening
 
In June 2003, two commercial WNV screening NATs were
distributed under investigational new drug approval by
FDA, produced by Manufacturer A and Manufacturer B.
The Manufacturer A assay was performed with minipools
(MPs) of 6 donation samples and real-time quantitative
reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (rtPCR),
whereas the Manufacturer B assay used MPs of 16 dona-
tion samples and transcription-mediated amplification
method.
 
9-11
 
Reactive MPs were defined with manufacturer-
specified parameters and cutoffs in pooled testing.
 
12,13
 
 The
component donations of reactive MPs were individually
tested with the same manufacturer-specific testing
modality as the MP test (rtPCR for Manufacturer A and
transcription-mediated amplification for Manufacturer
B). For both assays, a reactive donation was defined as a
donation from a reactive MP that was also reactive on
individual-donation testing (IDT). Donors were presumed
to be WNV viremic if their donation tested reactive twice
by IDT (presumptive viremic donors [PVDs]), which was
shown to have 99 percent positive predictive value for true
WNV infection.
 
10
 
 One large BCA, screening donations with
Manufacturer B assays, considered a single IDT result with
a signal to cutoff ratio value above 20 to define the donor
as a PVD; this was shown to have greater than 95 percent
correlation with confirmed positive results at that BCA.
BCAs contacted viremic donors to inform them of
their test results and to collect additional information,
including recent travel history, other exposure history, and
review of symptoms compatible with WNV illness occur-
ring within 3 weeks before or after donation. Both manu-
facturers performed additional testing to confirm the
presence of WNV in the donation sample and determine
the viral titer. Infection by WNV was confirmed by detec-
tion of virus-specific immunoglobulin M (IgM) antibody
in the donation or seroconversion documented in follow-
up samples with WNV-specific IgM antibody enzyme-
linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) testing.
To assist with national WNV surveillance and control
efforts, BCAs were asked to share WNV NAT screening data
by reporting PVDs to the donor’s state of residence health
department. In addition to the date of donation and pre-
liminary testing results, PVD age, sex, zip code, and the
results of follow-up antibody testing were reported. State
health departments also performed separate epidemio-
logic investigations of reported WNV infections in PVDs.
State health departments were asked to report PVDs
to ArboNET, a cooperative surveillance project between
CDC and 57 state and local health departments that mon-
itors domestic arbovirus activities. PVDs were reported as
asymptomatic infections; if a PVD developed WNV illness,
the state reported that illness to ArboNET according to the
corresponding clinical category (e.g., West Nile fever
[WNF] or West Nile neuroinvasive diseases [WNNDs] in-
cluding encephalitis, meningitis, meningoencephalitis, or
acute flaccid paralysis).
 
WNV TAT investigations
 
To determine the effectiveness of blood screening and to
identify blood donors with very-low-level viremia that
may not have been detected with MP NAT, suspected
WNV TAT cases were investigated. Cases were identified
in two ways: 1) public health investigations of WNV illness
among blood donors and transfusion recipients (public
health–initiated  investigations)  and  2)  forward  tracing
of cases identified by BCAs performing retrospective IDT
of archived samples in selected areas (BCA-initiated
investigations).
 
Public health–initiated investigations
 
During routine investigation of WNV illnesses, public
health authorities inquired whether reported patients had
either received a blood transfusion or donated blood dur-
ing the 30 days before illness onset. If the patient had
received blood, his or her illness was considered a sus-
pected WNV TAT case; if the patient had donated blood,
the recipients of the associated blood components were
considered suspected WNV TAT case-patients. Suspected
cases were reported to CDC and investigated.
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BCA-initiated investigations
 
To evaluate the sensitivity of the MP-NAT screening algo-
rithm, several BCAs in regions with high levels of WNV
transmission retested archived individual-donation sam-
ples that had previously tested nonreactive in MPs. Detec-
tion of reactive donations triggered immediate quarantine
and retrieval to prevent transfusion of corresponding
components. Because the donations did not react in MP-
NAT screening, however, some components had already
been transfused before these results were obtained. Addi-
tional WNV RNA and WNV-specific IgM antibody testing
of the available index donation specimens and follow-up
donor samples was conducted to confirm WNV infection.
Transfusion recipients of the potentially infectious blood
components were notified of the WNV testing results. The
BCA notified CDC when any implicated components had
been transfused and an investigation was initiated.
 
Transfusion recipient investigations
 
For both public health– and BCA-initiated investigations,
the suspected case-patient’s attending physician was con-
tacted and a medical record review was performed with a
standard data collection form. Information on WNV ill-
ness diagnosis, medical history, donation or transfusion
record, clinical course, and outcome was recorded. When
available, specimens collected before or at the time of
transfusion and follow-up serum samples were submitted
for WNV-specific antibody and virus testing at CDC’s
Arboviral Disease Branch (Fort Collins, CO).
 
Laboratory testing
 
BCA retrospective testing samples and follow-
up samples were forwarded to CDC for fur-
ther evaluation. Available blood components
that had not been transfused were recalled
and tested by rtPCR for presence of virus
genome. When sufficient volumes were
available, plasma components were tested
for WNV RNA with a modification of a previ-
ously published protocol in which a larger
input sample volume was utilized for testing
to increase sensitivity.
 
3
 
 RNA was extracted
from 0.5 mL of plasma with a kit (Qiagen,
Valencia, CA) and resuspended in 0.1 mL.
This amplification was performed as previ-
ously described, with the exception that 25 
 
µ
 
l
of RNA was included in the amplification
mixture. In addition, all samples were tested
for WNV-specific antibody by IgM-capture
ELISA; antibody specificity for WNV was con-
firmed by plaque reduction neutralization
testing at CDC.
 
14
 
Definitions
 
A viremic component was defined as any component
derived from a donation that contained WNV RNA based
on NAT performed by the BCA or CDC. WNV infection in
a donor was confirmed by the presence of WNV-specific
antibody either in the index donation or in subsequently
collected follow-up samples.
A probable case of WNV TAT was defined as a recipi-
ent of a viremic component who then developed evidence
of WNV infection, defined as identification of WNV-
specific antibody in the recipient’s samples (serum or
cerebrospinal fluid [CSF]) collected after transfusion with
the implicated component. A confirmed case was a prob-
able case that also satisfied one of the following: 1) the
recipient did not have exposure to possibly infectious
mosquitoes within 14 days before illness onset, 2) stored
recipient samples collected before and after transfusion
demonstrated that the infection was temporally related to
the implicated transfusion, or 3) a recipient of a cocom-
ponent from the same blood donation developed a con-
firmed or probable WNV infection.
 
RESULTS
 
PVDs reported to ArboNET
 
During 2003, a total of 818 PVDs were reported to Arbo-
NET by 33 states; 640 (78%) were from 6 states: Colorado,
Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Texas
(Fig. 1, Table 1). These states accounted for 55 percent of
the WNND cases reported to ArboNET in 2003. Dates of
PVD donation ranged from May 21 to December 1, 2003;
the peak number of PVDs donated blood during the week
 
Fig. 1.
 
 
 
Number of reported WNV PVDs and confirmed and probable TAT cases by 
county of recipient residence, 2003.
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ending August 23 (Fig. 2). Complete demographic infor-
mation was available for 811 PVDs; 446 (56%) were male
and the median age was 46 years (range, 15-83 years). Of
these 811, 6 (0.7%) developed WNND (median age,
45 years; range, 28-76 years) and 137 (17%) developed
WNF (median age, 46 years; range, 17-76 years).
A total of 224 PVDs were reported to CDC in 2004 from
29 states. Most PVDs (169 PVDs, 75%) were reported from
5 states (Arizona, California, Colorado, Louisiana, and
New Mexico; Fig. 3, Table 1), the same 5 states where
58 percent (663 cases) of 1,148 WNND cases were reported
in 2004. Dates of donation by PVDs ranged from April 23
to October 26, 2004, with a peak number reported during
the week ending July 31 (Fig. 2). Complete demographic
information was available for 220 PVDs; 127 (58%) were
male and the median age was 50 years (range, 17-
83 years). Of these 220, 4 (1.8%) developed WNND (ages
35, 65, 69, and 77 years) and 66 (30%) developed WNF
(median age, 52 years; range 17-75 years).
In 2005 (Fig. 4, Table 1), 417 PVDs were reported from
33 states; 3 (1%) subsequently developed WNND and 91
(22%) WNF. Of 391 PVDs with complete demographic
information available, the median age was 47 years (range,
17-83 years) and 230 (59%) were male. As in previous
epidemics, the majority of PVDs (265 PVDs, 63%) were
reported from 6 states (Arizona, California, Kansas, Loui-
siana, Nebraska, and Texas; Fig. 4, Table 1), which also
accounted for 51 percent (666) of 1,309 WNND cases
reported that same year.
 
2003 TAT investigations
 
In 2003, a total of 36 suspected cases of WNV TAT were
reported to CDC. Of these, 18 (50%) resulted from public
health–initiated investigations and 18 were identified
from BCA-initiated investigations. Suspected cases were
reported from 15 states: Arizona, California, Colorado,
Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, South
Dakota, and Texas.
Of the 36 investigations of suspected TAT, 5 were clas-
sified as probable TAT cases and 1 as a confirmed case.
Two cases (the confirmed case and one probable case)
resulted from BCA-initiated investigations; the other 4
probable cases resulted from public health–initiated
investigations. Of the remaining 30 suspected case inves-
tigations, no WNV infection was documented in either the
donor or the recipient in 12 investigations, and 18 were
inconclusive.
In each of the 6 probable or confirmed TAT cases,
the recipient received components from multiple dona-
tions; however, only 1 blood component containing WNV
RNA was found in each case. The 6 infectious donations
were collected during July 29 to September 18, 2003; all
had been screened in MPs and none were detected.
The median age of the 6 recipients was 63 years (range,
13-82 years); 4 had WNV encephalitis, 1 had WNF, and 1
critically ill  patient did not have discernible WNV-
compatible illness. Seroconversion was documented in
1 case and all donations tested were negative for WNV-
specific antibody, indicating that recipient antibody titers
were not due to passive transfer via transfusion from
seropositive donors. In 4 of these 6 cases, sufficient dona-
tion sample was available to estimate the titer of the im-
plicated donor’s viremia. The median estimated level of
viremia was 0.1 plaque-forming unit (PFU) per mL (range,
0.06-0.5 PFU/mL; Table 2). Details of the investigations
 
TABLE 1. Number of PVDs reported to ArboNET, 
2003 through 2005
 
*
 
State†
PVDs by year
2003 2004 2005
AL 0 0 4
AZ 3 36 20
CA 1 66 88
CO 83 24 2
DE 0 1 0
FL 1 3 1
GA 9 4 4
ID 0 0 1
IL 1 1 12
IN 0 1 7
IA 5 4 18
KS 101 4 30
KY 2 1 1
LA 5 12 21
MD 9 1 2
MA 1 0 0
MI 6 3 6
MN 23 2 11
MS 4 2 2
MO 7 2 1
MT 5 0 2
NE 182 3 49
NV 0 5 3
NJ 8 1 0
NM 10 15 5
NY 2 1 1
NC 0 0 1
ND 62 1 5
OH 4 0 16
OK 20 8 16
OR 0 1 1
PA 2 1 4
SD 63 3 18
TN 3 0 0
TX 66 16 57
UT 0 0 4
VA 1 0 0
WI 0 2 4
WV 1 0 0
WY 21 0 0
Total 711 224 417
* These counts reflect PVD reports to ArboNET for public 
release. Additional reports have been included in the 
description of the PVDs but are not listed here.
† AK, AR, CT, HI, ME, NH, RI, SC, VT, and WA reported no PVDs 
during 2003 through 2005.
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and the clinical courses of 6 confirmed or probable cases
are described below.
 
Patient 1. 
 
On August 5, 2003, a 72-year-old man
received 5 blood components after aortic graft surgery. All
5 components, derived from separate donations, did not
react in MP testing. At the time of transfusion, the patient
was in poor health with sepsis. Fever and signs of enceph-
alitis were identified on Day 3 after transfusion. Two more
components were transfused on Day 8. On Day 9, as a
result of a BCA-initiated investigation, the hospital was
notified that the patient had been transfused with a
potentially WNV-viremic component in
the initial transfusion. WNV infection
was confirmed on Day 11 by identifying
WNV-specific IgM and neutralizing
antibody in the patient’s serum. Clinical
serum specimens from the patient col-
lected Days 2 and 7 after transfusion
were recovered and tested; WNV RNA
was detected by rtPCR in both samples
but was not present in serum collected
on Day 11 after transfusion. The patient
improved and was discharged to a long-
term care facility.
Samples from the five MP-negative
donations were retested individually by
NAT. One donation was reactive and
was the source of a red blood cell (RBC)
unit  that  was  transfused  into  the
WNV-infected recipient. This result was
confirmed by repeated testing with dif-
ferent NAT formats. No cocomponents
(i.e., plasma, platelets [PLTs]) of the
implicated donation were recovered for
testing. The index donation sample was
negative for WNV-specific IgM and IgG
antibodies. The donor was asymptom-
atic during the preceding month; a
blood sample collected 30 days after the
implicated donation did not react on
NAT but was positive for the presence of
WNV-specific IgM and IgG antibody at
a commercial laboratory.
 
Patient 2. 
 
On August 6, 2003, an 82-
year-old woman with myelodysplasia
received transfusion of 2 units of RBCs.
On Day 11 after transfusion, the patient
had onset of nausea, fever, and malaise;
on Day 13, she was found unconscious
and was admitted to the hospital. Dur-
ing hospitalization, the patient received
three additional transfusions. On Day
15, she was discharged to a long-term
care facility. Serum collected on the day
of discharge was positive for the pres-
ence of WNV-specific IgM antibody. Four weeks later
(43 days after initial transfusion), she was readmitted to
the hospital with a history of repeated falls, septic shock,
and gastrointestinal bleeding. The patient expired the fol-
lowing day; the primary cause of death was ascribed to
WNV encephalitis.
The 2 units transfused on August 6 were collected
from 2 donors on July 30, 2003; both donations did not
react in MP testing. Neither donor reported illness before
or after the date of donation. Only one donation plasma
unit was recovered, which was reactive for WNV RNA by
 
Fig. 2.
 
 
 
Reported PVDs by date of donation, United States, 2003 through 2005.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50
MMWR week
N
um
be
r 
o
f P
VD
s
2003 PVDs
2004 PVDs
2005 PVDs
 
Fig. 3.
 
 
 
Number of reported WNV PVDs by county, 2004.
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IDT conducted by the BCA. Testing at CDC detected an
estimated 0.5 PFU per mL but no WNV-specific IgM anti-
body. Follow-up serum samples were collected from
both  donors 10 weeks after donation; only the donor of
the implicated unit had WNV-specific IgM and IgG
antibody.
 
Patient 3. 
 
On August 31, 2003, a 13-year-old boy was
admitted to a hospital with injuries secondary to blunt
trauma. On September 1, he received 3 units of RBCs. The
recipient was discharged from the hospital on Day 8 after
transfusion and developed a maculopapular rash. On
Day 11, he was readmitted to the hospital with fever, head-
ache, vomiting, and diarrhea. Blood
drawn on admission was positive for
the presence of WNV-specific IgM anti-
body. The recipient recovered without
sequelae.
The 3 transfused units had been
collected during the second week of
August 2003. None of the donors
reported symptoms of WNV illness
before or after donation. All 3 donations
did not react in MP testing. All remain-
ing components derived from the dona-
tions were recovered. The recovered
plasma components were WNV IgM–
negative. Recovered plasma from one
donor was reactive in IDT. The donor of
this unit had developed WNV-specific
IgM antibody by Day 50 after the impli-
cated donation.
 
Patient 4. 
 
A 52-year-old man was
admitted to a hospital on September 22,
2003, for aortic valve replacement and
coronary artery bypass graft surgery. At the time of surgery
on September 23, the patient received transfusion of 7
RBC units. He was discharged in stable condition on Sep-
tember 29. On October 7, Day 13 after the last transfusion,
the patient was readmitted with fever, confusion, tremors,
and hypotension. During this hospitalization, the patient
developed mental status changes later attributed to WNV
encephalitis based on detected virus-specific IgM in CSF
collected on Day 19 after the last transfusion. The patient
improved and was discharged to a rehabilitation facility
on Hospitalization Day 38.
The 7 transfused RBC units did not react in MP test-
ing. Follow-up serum samples and available cocompo-
 
Fig. 4.
 
 
 
Number of reported WNV PVDs by county, 2005.
 
TABLE 2. Demographic and transfusion information for probable and confirmed TAT cases
 
Patient
Age
(years) Sex
State of
residence
Reason for
transfusions
Number of
components
transfused
during
hospitalization
Type of
components
Estimated 
viremia in 
implicated 
component
(PFU/mL)
WNV illness and TAT
case classification
1 72 Male Texas CABG* surgery 7† RBCs‡ NA‡ Encephalitis; confirmed
2 82 Female Texas Myelodysplastic 
syndrome
5 RBCs 0.5 Encephalitis; probable
3 13 Male Iowa Motor vehicle accident 3 RBCs 0.09 WNF; probable
4 52 Male Kansas CABG/aortic valve 
replacement surgery
7 RBCs 0.06 Encephalitis; probable
5 55 Male New Mexico
(hospitalized
in Texas)
Complications of CABG
surgery
154§ RBCs, plasma,
PLTs
NA No discernible WNV
illness; probable
6 80 Male Nebraska CABG surgery 26 RBCs, plasma,
PLTs
0.11 Encephalitis; probable
* CABG 
 
=
 
 coronary artery bypass graft.
† Tested individually in retrospective study.
‡ NA 
 
=
 
 insufficient specimen available.
§ Not all transfused components were retrospectively tested. A single unit identified on retrospective testing was the basis for the investigation.
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nents from all seven donors were tested; one donor had
evidence of recent WNV infection, with WNV-specific IgM
and IgG antibody detected in serum collected Day 39 after
the date of donation. The implicated donation plasma
contained WNV genome but no WNV-specific antibody
when tested at CDC.
 
Patient 5. 
 
On August 4, 2003, a 55-year-old man was
admitted to a Texas hospital for vascular graft site infec-
tion. During 11 weeks of hospitalization, the patient suf-
fered severe complications, requiring multiple surgeries,
ventilatory support, and transfusion with 154 blood com-
ponents. On August 26, the hospital was notified that a
RBCs transfused 13 days earlier potentially contained
WNV based on IDT done on the associated donation as
part of a BCA-initiated retrospective study. No discernible
WNV illness in the recipient was detected. A recipient
serum sample collected on August 24, Day 11 after trans-
fusion with the implicated component, was positive for
the presence of WNV IgM antibodies. No pretransfusion
samples were available for testing.
Of the source donations of the 154 components trans-
fused, some donations had been collected before the
institution of WNV screening. All of the screened compo-
nents (the majority of the components given to the
patient) did not react by MP testing; less than 10 percent
were tested retrospectively by IDT. Low-level WNV RNA
was detected in a retrospectively tested donation, col-
lected on August 6. The implicated donor had no reported
WNV symptoms at the time of donation. The index dona-
tion sample did not have WNV-specific antibodies. The
donor’s WNV infection was confirmed by detection of IgM
and IgG antibody in a follow-up serum sample collected
22 days after the implicated donation was collected.
 
Patient 6. 
 
An 80-year-old man was hospitalized for
coronary artery bypass graft surgery. As previously pub-
lished,
 
15
 
 after surgery on August 4, 2003, the patient
received 26 blood components, including RBCs, PLTs, and
fresh-frozen plasma. The patient was discharged on
August 14. On August 17, Day 13 after the transfusions, the
patient developed mental status changes and fever; he
was admitted to the hospital on Day 15 with a diagnosis
of encephalitis. Serum and CSF collected on Day 16 after
transfusion contained WNV-specific IgM antibody. He
improved sufficiently to be discharged to a long-term care
facility on September 11.
Of the 26 index donations, 20 did not react in MP
testing. Six donations had been collected in February
2003, before WNV screening had been implemented. Sam-
ples from the 20 screened donations were tested by NAT
at three different laboratories, including CDC; WNV RNA
was detected in one sample by CDC and one of the other
two laboratories with an estimated viral load of 0.11 PFU
per mL. The plasma from the implicated index donation
did not contain WNV-specific IgM antibody. A follow-up
serum sample collected from the donor 45 days after the
implicated donation was positive for the presence of
virus-specific IgM antibody.
 
2004 and 2005 TAT investigations
 
In 2004, 15 suspected cases were investigated; 4 of the 15
were BCA-initiated investigations and the remaining 11
were public health–initiated investigations. A single prob-
able case of WNV TAT was documented. The implicated
donation, collected on July 17, 2004, in Maricopa County,
Arizona, was screened in a nonreactive MP of 16 donation
samples.
 
16
 
 Of the remaining 14 investigations, no WNV
infection was identified in either donor or recipient in 7
investigations and 7 were inconclusive.
Eight suspected cases were investigated during 2005;
all were public health–initiated investigations. In 6 inves-
tigations, none of the donors were WNV-infected or the
recipient did not have an acute WNV infection. Two inves-
tigations were inconclusive based on lack of specimens for
testing.
 
DISCUSSION
 
Two approaches were implemented in 2003 to reduce the
threat of WNV to the US blood supply: 1) deferral of
donors with fever and headache in the week before dona-
tion and 2) screening donated blood with WNV NAT with
an MP testing format. MP format was used because of the
constraints of screening the approximately 15 million
donations collected annually. Based on a 2003 American
Red Cross study, the donor deferral question concerning
headache with fever did not predict donor WNV infection
status effectively, and the FDA withdrew guidance recom-
mending this deferral question in Fall 2005.
 
17,18
 
 Screening
by MP-NAT identified 818 infected blood donors who were
reported to public health authorities in 2003 and success-
fully removed at least 1100 potentially infectious compo-
nents from the blood supply, based on an estimated 1.45
components derived from every donation.
 
19
 
 Despite this
success, the 6 recipients infected through blood transfu-
sion in 2003 indicated that the risk of acquiring infection
from infectious blood components was not completely
eliminated by MP-NAT screening.
The NAT assays used in 2003 were developed to detect
donations with viral loads comparable to donations impli-
cated in WNV TAT in 2002. In 2003, the estimated viremia
levels in implicated donation plasma ranged from 0.06 to
0.50 PFU per mL, lower than the 0.8 to 75.1 PFU per mL
range for TAT cases during 2002.
 
7
 
 These levels are esti-
mates based on NAT of small sample volumes of plasma
and may overestimate the numbers of infectious virus
particles circulating in whole blood or found in separated
and processed blood components. Under the investiga-
tional new drug process, NAT screening tests were con-
sidered experimental, because the performance of the
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assays, including sensitivity and specificity, was undeter-
mined for blood supply screening. For these reasons, the
residual risk of transfusion-transmitted WNV infection
after screening implementation was not known.
In addition to the sensitivity of the two assays, other
limitations may have hindered detection and investiga-
tion of possible TAT cases. Public health surveillance for
suspect TAT cases and the subsequent investigations were
limited by potential lack of recognition of WNV illness in
transfusion recipients and by lack of available clinical
specimens collected around the time of transfusion,
needed to help establish the source of infection. Because
clinical specimens are not routinely stored, documenting
WNV infection at the time of transfusion was often not
possible. Investigations based on BCA retrospective test-
ing studies were similarly limited. Notification of the
results of these studies often came weeks after transfu-
sion. Finally, all suspected cases were from states also
reporting WNV illnesses, and mosquito transmission may
have been the source of infection for recipients in areas
with epidemic WNV transmission. Several of the investi-
gated cases, however, were continuously hospitalized
before the onset of their WNV infection, which likely
reduced or eliminated mosquito exposure.
Data collected during 2003 were carefully considered
by the blood industry in collaboration with public health
authorities to design strategies to further improve screen-
ing sensitivity while considering the impact lower speci-
ficity from IDT might have on the US blood supply
availability. Strategies to improve sensitivity, such as selec-
tive IDT (e.g., triggering of systemwide IDT when at least
one viremic donation is collected per week with the stan-
dard MP screening algorithm), were employed midseason
during 2003 in areas with intense WNV activity and pro-
spectively nationwide starting in 2004.
 
10,11
 
 In addition, the
manufacturers addressed sensitivity and specificity issues
with modifications to both assays.
 
20
 
 Year-round IDT may
not be feasible; however, switching from pooled to IDT on
the basis of BCA-derived triggers may reduce the risk of
TAT in areas with intense WNV activity.
 
21
 
Nationally, both 2004 and 2005 epidemics were much
smaller than those occurring in 2002 and 2003. At certain
times, however, local areas, such as Maricopa County,
Arizona, in 2004, may experience intense transmission
and have proportionally greater numbers of potentially
viremic donations collected, reflecting the effect of local
conditions on WNV transmission. The single case of WNV
TAT in 2004 involved a donation collected in Maricopa
County before the BCA instituted an algorithm for switch-
ing to IDT.
 
16
 
 Systemwide approaches to WNV screening
and blood safety must be flexible enough to respond to
the focal and unpredictable nature of WNV epidemics.
The reporting and investigation of suspected TAT
cases is critical for the response to known and emerging
blood supply risks such as WNV. Screening procedures
address known WNV risks, but several characteristics of
WNV infection, such as persistence of infectious virus in
the presence of antibody response, have not been fully
described.
 
22
 
 Recently, the FDA published guidance to
industry recommending that donors who test viremic or
have WNV illness be deferred from donating for 120 days
from the date of viremic donation or illness in response to
results of BCA follow-up studies of PVDs, which indicate
that virus genome can be detected in blood samples
collected as many as 104 days after the original viremic
donation date.
 
23
 
 Blood screening strategies, including the
trigger-based IDT screening for WNV, cannot be fully eval-
uated without the epidemiologic evidence resulting from
continuous vigilance for TAT by frontline clinicians and
public health authorities. Clinicians should consider pos-
sible TAT of infectious disease, including WNV, when eval-
uating illnesses in recent transfusion recipients and report
suspected cases to public health authorities.
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